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Introduction
"Civil rights" has been a powerful frame for spurring transformative reform on a range of issues, including gender violence.
1 Civil rights litigation beginning in the 1970's provoked significant policy reforms by challenging law enforcement's failed responses to domestic violence calls. 2 More recently, the civil rights remedy enacted as part of the 1994 Violence Against Women Act, 3 captured the imagination of advocates and the general public alike. 4 The civil rights frame helped spur public conversations about the relationship between gender violence and gender equality and held the potential to generate transformative change. A civil rights frame has enduring potential to support much needed reform by challenging structural inequalities that continue to inform and drive gender violence. Multiple issues might be addressed. For example, legislation might provide a private right of action modeled on the involve misuse of authority and should be thought of in tandem. 16 This shift can reinvigorate existing strategies and can generate new approaches to both law and policy.
Part I starts with an overview of civil and human rights-based reform to redress gender violence. It recaps the dual focus of U.S.-based civil rights-based reforms: law enforcement accountability and a remedy against private individuals. It traces the overall trajectory of reform on both issues, including their culmination in constrained Supreme Court decisions. The section contrasts the lack of advocacy for corrective legislation in this context with legislative responses to other restrictive Supreme Court decisions and posits reasons for the absence of a robust advocacy-based reaction.
Part II argues for a revived civil rights approach. It draws on civil rights laws' historic utility in advancing institutional reform, and argues that ongoing problems with law enforcement responses to gender violence warrant renewed consideration. Part III reviews the status of federal caselaw holding law enforcement accountable for responding to gender violence. It outlines the doctrinal arguments that remain available notwithstanding an increasingly narrowed doctrinal framework and argues that those arguments can and should be more widely used. It demonstrates that current doctrine is unnecessarily constrained and out of step with emerging international norms.
Part IV considers approaches to law enforcement accountability for gender violence that are not grounded in traditional civil rights litigation. It argues that administrative remedies typically invoked in law enforcement misconduct cases involving over-enforcement should more broadly be available to ensure accountability for gender-based claims. A shift to a civil rights lens also could galvanize community organizing and activism. Part V considers limitations of shifting focus to state accountability as a matter of civil rights enforcement. The article concludes with suggestions for future reform.
I. Civil rights, human rights and gender violence

A. Overview
Notwithstanding arguments that the United States' current approach to civil rights laws has outlived its usefulness, 17 and recent United States Supreme Court decisions narrowing the availability of remedies under a variety of civil rights protections, 18 civil rights law and rhetoric continues to be a powerful frame for meaningful reform. 19 The term "civil rights" has its roots in the post-slavery movement to ensure equality for African Americans. 20 It typically is invoked to refer to principles of equality and liberty protected by the constitution. 21 The civil rights framework is grounded in the concept that those who discriminate based on impermissible biases and stereotypes violate legal and social norms, and that the person discriminated against should be eligible for redress. 22 The notion of "rights" has held expressive and symbolic value as part of social movements' efforts to advance transformative change. 23 I invoke the term to reference 17 See generally, e.g., RICHARD FORD, RIGHTS GONE WRONG 10-11 (2011) (arguing that civil rights "do too much and not enough at the same time"). 18 See, e.g., Connick v. House, Civil Rights, http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/civil-rights (stating that "President Obama recognizes that our civil rights laws and principles are at the core of our nation," and citing multiple civil rights advances of the administration). 20 For discussion of the trajectory of the civil rights movement, including attendant debates, for example, over whether law reform should seek equality of opportunity or of result, and of strategic lawyering choices, for example, over whether to prioritize ending segregation or advancing economic equality, see, e.g., RISA L. and has generated calls for reform under international human rights and local law, it has not generated mainstream or widespread calls for federal civil rights reform.
The case involved a tragic set of facts, which have been widely reported. 41 Jessica
Gonzales sued the local police under the Section 1983, alleging substantive and procedural due process violations, after local law enforcement failed to respond to her repeated requests to enforce the domestic violence protective order she had against her estranged husband. 42 Her fears that he had abducted her children turned out to be founded; when he eventually showed up at the police department, a shooting ensured and her children were found dead in the trunk of his 43 Id. at ¶ 32. 44 The claim alleged initially brought in the U.S. District Court alleged that the town of Castle Rock violated Jessica Gonzales' due process rights because "its police department had an official policy or custom of failing to respond properly to complaints of restraining order violations" and "of tolerating the non-enforcement of restraining orders," and that the town's actions "were taken either willfully, recklessly or with such gross negligence as to indicate wanton disregard and deliberate indifference" to Ms. Lenahan's civil rights. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 754. 45 545 U.S. at 754-55 (distinguishing substantive due process claims from the procedural due process claim before the Court). The lower courts had concluded that Ms. Gonzales' claim did not fall within the narrow "state-created danger" exception to the DeShaney decision's rule that the state has no duty to protect its citizens from harm committed by a private third party, since there was no indication that the police created or enhanced the danger posed by Simon Gonzales. Cir. 2002) . The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals clarified the distinction between the respective theories, see 366 F.3d at 1099-1100, and the Supreme Court did not disturb that distinction. See, e.g., Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 755-56 (distinguishing substantive from procedural due process theories). For discussion of the significance of this limited holding, see infra note 55 to 56, and accompanying text. 46 545 U.S. at 766. 47 Inter-American Comm'n, at ¶ ¶ 1, 40-44. 48 See, e.g., Inter-American Comm'n, ¶ ¶115-135 (summarizing States' legal obligation to protect women from domestic violence under international human rights law). For further discussion of the case, see infra notes 50 to 53, and accompanying text. 49 ensure mandatory enforcement of protection orders. 51 It also recommended the continued adoption of public policies and programs aimed at restructuring the stereotypes of domestic violence victims, and at promoting the eradication of discriminatory socio-cultural patterns that impede women and children's full protection from domestic violence. 52 Although the United
States has taken the position that it is not bound to the American Declaration, 53 the Commission's decision at a minimum constitutes persuasive authority for reconsidering the adequacy of the United States' legal and policy-based approach.
54
The IACHR decision and corresponding international developments elaborating state obligations to exercise due diligence with respect to gender violence should prod us to reconsider how existing and potential remedies can best ensure law enforcement accountability. For example, the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court decision addressed only Ms. Lenahan's procedural due process claim is notable, particularly given that previous cases largely had been based either on equal protection or substantive due process theories. 55 Accordingly, the Supreme Court decision leaves undisturbed the other, more frequently used, theories under which survivors of gender violence have held and continue to hold law enforcement accountable for failed responses to domestic and sexual violence calls. 56 As a general matter, the IACHR decision serves as a reminder to think broadly about how U.S. law and policy most effectively can advance the shared interests in equality and due process that underlie both U.S. and international law and policy. 59 and to add a remedy to then-existing federal civil rights laws, which afforded redress against private institutions, 60 groups of individuals, 61 or state actors, both individual and institutional. 62 It was designed to fill a gap in accountability measures: no thenexisting federal civil rights law provided redress against the private individuals who committed most of those violations. 63 The private right of action against an individual perpetrator held the potential for practical and transformative redress: it could afford both compensation for the economic losses occasioned by the abuse and could shift conceptions of abuse from a private matter shrouded in secrecy to a matter of public concern. 64 During the years the civil rights remedy was in effect, approximately 50 to 60 decisions had addressed the civil rights remedy and virtually all had upheld its constitutionality. 65 Both sexual assault and domestic violence survivors had obtained relief under the law while it was in effect. 66 The Supreme Court ultimately struck down the law as an unconstitutional exercise of In some ways, this critique can be seen as a product of the movement's success.
C. Individual accountability through private right of action
Increased government funding has expanded the availability of both social services and legal advocates. 78 Those services are critically important, and continue to be under-resourced. 79 But it also has shifted focus from grassroots activism and calls for systemic reform to service delivery, mental health and criminal justice responses. 80 That shift has diminished the focus on reforms that are driven by survivors' priorities, and that are focused on structural reform, such as ending women's subordination and increasing social and economic empowerment.
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It follows that the emphasis on services and state collaboration, while valuable, will reduce the likelihood that advocates will take positions in opposition to established programs. The net result of the shift from activism to service delivery with the accompanying increase in state funding for programs and services has reduced the likelihood that problems with law enforcement responsiveness will be framed as matters of civil rights. The absence of a vibrant civil rights frame for gender violence claims shapes public discourse accordingly. It masks problems that might surface through an equality or due process lens and in turn limits the potential for policy-based reform.
Limits of identity politics
The absence of a call for reform reflects another movement trend as well. or sexual violence, 99 at the same time that they suffer the consequences of over-policing. 100 Policies that endorse law enforcement discretion to disregard survivors' calls for assistance undermine survivors' autonomy much the same as mandatory arrest policies. 101 The same critique should apply to both. That some of the cases challenging law enforcement's underresponsiveness to gender violence have been brought by women of color underscores the importance of these cases as part of a robust civil rights response.
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II. Reviving civil rights: law enforcement accountability as police misconduct
A new federal civil rights-based approach to gender violence might take several forms.
This section focuses on institutional accountability and argues that new strategies productively could address ongoing problems with law enforcement responses to gender violence calls.
A. Individual and institutional actors
Historically, civil rights claims to redress gender violence have encompassed claims against both individual and institutional actors. 103 112 See, e.g., supra note 39 (discussing policy responses to lawsuits brought against municipalities for failed responses to domestic and sexual violence). the context of gender violence, is inherently limited in its ability to advance the practical and transformative goals of civil rights recovery. 113 The use of civil rights laws to prod law enforcement responsiveness to marginalized groups is not new. As Zanita Fenton has argued, police refusal to protect battered women is analogous to law enforcement's historic refusal to enforce the law to protect African-Americans, which led to the enactment of the Reconstruction-era civil rights statutes, including section 1983. 114 One of the core purposes of that law was to provide a federal remedy for nonenforcement of state remedies to prevent violence against individuals. 115 Implicit in the VAWA civil rights remedy's focus on individual liability was the assumption that the bedrock civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. §1983 ("section 1983") would afford redress in cases alleging institutional failures involving state actors. 116 Ongoing problems with law enforcement accountability demonstrate the continued need for both robust enforcement of existing legal theories, and for new and complementary strategies that would advance greater accountability.
B. Law enforcement accountability and civil rights
Notwithstanding the significant progress in law enforcement policies and practices in response to gender violence, problems remain. The United Nations Special Rapporteur has documented the historic and ongoing problems with enforcement of anti-domestic violence laws in the United States. 117 
III. Federal civil rights caselaw
Popular accounts would suggest that the Supreme Court's Castle Rock decision eliminated all avenues of redress when law enforcement fails to enforce a protective order. 132 The decision in fact was more limited. The Court rejected procedural due process claims as a basis for enforcing protective orders. 133 But procedural due process had not been the theory most commonly used for holding law enforcement accountable for reasonably responding to domestic and sexual violence calls. Other theories, notably, the state-created danger exception to the DeShaney decision rejecting a general public duty to protect private individuals, as well as equal protection arguments, had been invoked more frequently than procedural due process, as a basis for holding law enforcement accountable to domestic and sexual violence survivors. 134 That said, even though those theories of recovery formally remain available, the scope of relief has narrowed in recent years. 135 This section outlines the scope of still-available relief.
A. Substantive due process and "state-created danger"
Although the landmark case DeShaney v. Winnebago County Board of Social Services, precludes many substantive due process claims, it set forth exceptions under which a state may be liable for failing to carry out its duties. 136 Those exceptions include claims based on a showing of a "special relationship" with law enforcement, for example, through a relationship created by taking someone into custody, 137 or, more pertinent to domestic violence-related claims, by putting someone in a more dangerous position than that which she otherwise would have experienced.
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Survivors may prevail under the state-created danger theory if they can establish that the officers' affirmative conduct created or increased the risk of private violence. 139 For example, in
Okin v. Village of Cornwall, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the substantive due process and municipal liability claims of Michele Okin based on allegations that despite her repeated calls for police assistance the police neither arrested her former partner Roy Charles Sears nor interviewed him at any length about her allegations. 140 The officers' actions, such as discussing football with Sears in response to Okin's complaint that Sears had beaten and tried to choke her, transmitted a message that Sears would not suffer any consequences for his acts of violence. 141 Similarly, officers' failure to intervene or arrest in response to Sears' comments that he could not "help it sometimes when he smacks Michele Okin around" and their failure to file a domestic incident report, to interview Sears, or to make an arrest in response to Okin's numerous allegations of Sears' abuse, further supported the courts' conclusion that the officers' actions constituted affirmative conduct that created or increased the risk of violence to her. 142 Other courts similarly have upheld substantive due process and municipal liability claims when a survivor identified a pattern of conduct, such as a failure to interview, investigate, or take any meaningful steps to determine whether arrest or further law enforcement action was warranted. 143 Courts seem particularly responsive to these claims when the alleged abuser either was a law enforcement officer, or was friends or otherwise associated with local law enforcement. Cir. 1990 ) (remanding for repleading on the theory that the officers affirmatively increased the danger to decedent). 144 See, e.g., Pearce, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 372 (perpetrator Longo was close friends and former partners with police chief); Freeman, 911 F.2d at 54-55 (police chief instructed subordinates to ignore victim's pleas for protection from her husband, who was the chief's friend); cf., Okin, 577 F. 3d at 426 & n.8 (recounting, though not ruling on, plaintiffs' allegations that officers had "significant personal relationships" with abusive partner and officer's testimony disputing that allegation). 145 See, e.g., Smithers v. Flint, 602 F.3d 758 (6 th Cir. 2010) (no liability when law enforcement officers arrested girlfriend for trespass, not domestic violence, and released her from custody; no suggestion that she would be held for period of time and actions may have been seen as reasonable); Culp v. Rutledge, 343 F. Appx. 128 (6 th Cir. 2009) (no liability notwithstanding law enforcement assurance that abusive partner would be arrested, he was not arrested, and subsequently shot the mother of ex-girlfriend); Burella v. Philadelphia, 501 F.3d 134 (3d Cir. 2007) (no liability notwithstanding long history of physical and emotional abuse, numerous reported incidents and purported violation of protective order; officer's failure to act not an affirmative misuse of authority); Hudson v. Hudson, 475 F.3d 741 (6 th Cir. 2007) (no liability when law enforcement made no attempt to find husband after wife called police department alleging violations of police department and he subsequently killed her and two friends; inaction not an "affirmative act"); Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1175-6 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 994 (1995) (no affirmative act when boyfriend set house on fire and killed plaintiff's children after police responded to her call for help, assured her that he would be locked up overnight, but released him). call enhanced the danger to domestic violence caller, noting that "facts of a particular case" are key to determining the existence of a violation). 146 Accord, Oren, supra note 46, at 51 (arguing that it is difficult to find a "principled difference" between cases upholding and rejecting state-created danger arguments).
Appeals' reasoning in Brooks v. Knapp . 147 There, Brenda Hernandez repeatedly called the police after incidents of threats and protective order violations by her husband, Gilbert Hernandez, including complaints that he had a gun and that he threatened to kill her. 148 In what was to be the final incident, the police were called after Mr. Hernandez physically assaulted her and ripped the phone out of the wall when she tried to call for help. 149 The police arrived, and put him in the back of a squad car, but did not handcuff him, allowed him to make phone calls, and, instead of arresting him, released him. 150 A few hours later, he broke into the house, shot and killed Mrs.
Hernandez, and killed himself. 151 In the subsequent section 1983 action by surviving family members, the court did not even analyze whether the officers' acts of releasing him and of providing assurances that additional patrols would be provided constituted affirmative acts that exposed her to increased risk of danger; instead the court rejected her substantive due process claim on the basis that the officers took no affirmative act.
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B. Equal protection
Other cases have invoked equal protection theories to challenge law enforcement approaches to domestic violence claims. 153 Courts have upheld arguments that law enforcement policies, for example, that treat domestic violence calls less seriously than non-domestic violence calls, could deny equal protection based on sex. 154 Evidence such as statistical data showing that non-domestic violence complaints were more likely to lead to arrest than comparable domestic violence complaints, 155 or that police officers were trained to "defuse" domestic violence situations and to arrest only as a last resort, 156 might allow a jury to infer discriminatory intent.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has gone as far as concluding that policies distinguishing domestic violence from non-domestic violence calls could fail even the rationality test under the Equal Protection Clause. 157 The Department of Justice has recognized that inaction in the form of practices that underserve certain communities also can violate equal protection. 158 Practices such as failing to investigate sexual assault and domestic violence, may constitute such discriminatory practice. 159 Evidence that police downgrade sexual assault complaints or deem them "unfounded" may reflect gender bias. 160 Data-driven evidence, for example, that a jurisdiction reports fewer forcible rapes than murders, also suggests policies that do not take gender-based crimes such as domestic and sexual violence seriously. 161 Evidence that a jurisdiction fails to discipline officers who have been accused of domestic violence also may evidence equal protection violations. 162 Officers' use of stereotyped comments also could support equal protection claims. 163 For example, stereotypical assumptions and judgments about sex crimes and victims of sex crimes, including misguided commentary about victims' perceived credibility, sexual history, or delay in contacting law enforcement, may skew law enforcement responses. 164 Law enforcement may downgrade sexual assault complaints without conducting a fact-based investigation. 165 Investigations may focus on proving an allegation to be false, or on the victim's trustworthiness, or may otherwise rely on stereotypes, for example, by asking victims why they did not resist, why they put themselves in certain situations, and why they did not immediately disclose the assault to police, family or friends. 166 Investigators may perpetuate stereotypes, for example, by asking blaming or leading questions. 167 They may rely on characterizations rather than the victims' own first-hand account, and may rarely question suspects. 168 Notwithstanding the prevalence of these practices, equal protection claims generally have proven to be difficult to sustain, primarily due to the challenges of establishing discriminatory intent or motive.
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C. (In)Adequacy of relief
The resulting doctrine under 1983 charts a patchwork of potential arguments that set a high threshold for relief. Unless a survivor can prove that an officer took affirmative acts that increased the risk of private violence, or unless she can prove that a policy intentionally was implemented to discriminate on the basis of gender (or another prohibited ground), section 1983
will not afford relief. The preceding summary of federal civil rights doctrine highlights both the formal availability of theories for redress and those theories' practical limitations as remedies for survivors. 170 For example, the current section 1983 framework would hold law enforcement 166 Id. at 46. 167 Id. at 47-48. For example, in an interview of a teenager who reported being assaulted by her moher's boyfriend, a detective recounted that in the victim's explanation of whether she resisted, she "didn't yell or scream, nor did she try to use her cell phone to call her mom or the police." Id. violence, but not in cases of flat inaction, and for cases in which policies could be proved to be intentionally discriminatory, but not for those that inadvertently discriminate.
We should ask whether this framework encourages meaningful and effective responses.
Some worry that the current framework will encourage law enforcement to ignore domestic violence calls, which would produce a return to the widely critiqued circumstances that led to the adoption of mandatory arrest policies in the first place. 171 Others have raised concerns that the framework encourages survivors and community members to take the law into their own hands, when trained law enforcement officers more effectively could respond. 172 Still others argue that, as a form of underenforcement, law enforcement's failure appropriately to respond to domestic violence claims casts doubt on the legitimacy of the criminal justice system.
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These inconsistencies and limitations of the current framework should be challenged. As
Natapoff has argued, a response to the problem of underenforcement calls for a different approach to police responsiveness, not simply for more policing. 174 Advocacy urging a more 180 At a minimum, increased public attention to and discussion of the shortcomings as well as successes of law enforcement intervention, framed in the language of human or civil rights, would generate dialog that could inform productive new initiatives.
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IV. Accountability reimagined
A reimagined civil rights approach would take a fresh look at how civil rights frameworks could support law enforcement accountability. New approaches could incorporate alternative strategies in addition to the statutory and litigation-based responses outlined above.
This section elaborates two: administrative accountability and community-based response.
A. Administrative remedies
A reimagined civil rights response might include remedies other than traditional civil litigation. If law enforcement's under-responsiveness to domestic and sexual violence claims were to be viewed on the continuum of police misconduct, additional remedies come into view. 191 The approach squarely frames problems of law enforcement accountability as a civil rights problem, and creates the potential for a uniform federal floor for accountability, much as with other civil rights claims.
On the other hand, the departmental capacity for undertaking investigations will be constrained by the availability of administrative resources, which may vary depending on the administration in office. 192 Since the statutes don't authorize a direct, private right of action, and since they set a threshold of liability for patterns or practices of wrongdoing, they may not afford redress in individual cases of misconduct. 193 In addition, they do not authorize financial compensation, which may render them unappealing and inadequate for complainants seeking compensation for financial losses in addition to changes in policies and practices.
of domestic and sexual violence. 194 An administrative guidance might confirm the Department of Justice's investigatory authority to investigate claims of gender-biased law enforcement practices. 195 Expanding the range of available remedies and publicizing their ability can go a long way toward shifting our popular understandings and promoting needed redress.
B. Community response
To some extent, the absence of a widespread call for reform reflects the fact that public discourse and rhetoric do not frame under-policing of gender violence as a matter of civil rights.
It follows that increased public education and community organizing could support reinvigorated reform. For example, community organizer Ejim Dike argues that community members may not be aware that United States law currently does not impose a duty on the government to provide protection from violence perpetrated by private actors. 196 Increased awareness of the limitations of current accountability schemes could generate engaged discussion and activism. It could foster new collaborations between grassroots groups and human rights projects that frame gender violence as a human rights violation. 197 As an issue that spans racial and gender justice concerns, it could support new coalitions and partnerships. 198 That type of activism could generate fresh approaches to law reform as well as policy-based change at the local level.
Local human rights ordinances affirming that freedom from domestic violence is a basic human right constitute one such approach. Law school clinics in Cincinnati, Baltimore and Miami drafted local human rights ordinances, each of which subsequently were adopted by their respective local city councils. 199 Those resolutions now can be used to advance public awareness and constitute an additional tool to support legal and policy-driven advocacy on behalf of survivors and their families.
V. Limitations and concerns
This proposal to promote mechanisms for advancing law enforcement accountability may raise several concerns. This section addresses two: the risk that such efforts will contribute to the existing over-criminalization of domestic violence, and concerns about the dangers of engaging with the state.
A. Over-criminalization
One issue raised by proposals to promote law enforcement accountability is the concern that responses would exacerbate the current emphasis on law enforcement interventions for domestic and sexual violence. As others have detailed, the extent to which criminal justice interventions have dominated the United States' legal and policy-based response to domestic and sexual violence has proved problematic, particularly for undocumented survivors, for those in communities of color and for the LGBT community. 200 But the question of the wisdom of supporting law enforcement initiatives as a preferred policy response to gender violence is analytically distinct from the question whether law enforcement should be accountable when survivors affirmatively seek intervention. 201 Critiques of over-criminalization should not mitigate the importance of consistent and non-discriminatory responses when survivors choose to reach out to law enforcement for assistance. 202 Advancing law enforcement accountability when survivors seek intervention would further, not thwart, efforts to support survivors' agency and empowerment. 203 Advocating for responsive and non-discriminatory policing is not a wholesale endorsement of criminal justice based responses. Instead, a call challenging over-as well as under-policing as misconduct reflects a practical, if incremental, approach to civil rights reform.
B. Engaging with the state
An additional concern may rest with the challenges associated with state intervention.
The history of feminists' calls for increased state responsiveness has been mixed at best. and argues that well-meaning reforms may even worsen dependencies. 205 On the other hand, feminists also propose reforms that would allocate resources to support a more responsive state.
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These concerns raise significant issues that must be parsed in the context of particular proposed reforms. Here, the proposal to bolster avenues for checking misuse of state power would give voice to survivors' experiences, and should not exacerbate the concerns about state supervision or state-supported dependency that have been the core of objections to a more robust state response. That said, charting an appropriate role for state intervention requires a delicate balance; one that is subject to checks and balances by government and community groups alike.
Conclusion
Framing law enforcement under-responsiveness to gender violence through the lens of underenforcement allows a re-imagining of how law and policy might meaningfully advance the federal interest in law enforcement accountability. At a minimum, the combined impact of the Inter-American Commission's decision in Lenahan v. United States and the increasing global recognition of the ways gender violence violates civil and human rights, suggest that we broadly consider new approaches that will most meaningfully and effectively deter and end all forms of gender violence.
This article calls for two shifts in approaches to anti-gender based violence advocacy. It urges a renewed focus on institutional accountability as a matter of civil rights. It argues that cases alleging law enforcement's failure to respond to domestic or sexual violence calls be treated as cases of police misconduct. As a practical matter, these shifts would make useful contributions to improving justice system responses to gender violence. They also would contribute to a new generation of progressive reform that advances the principles of equality and liberty for which civil rights long has stood.
